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SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT.
The enactment of workman's compensation laws by a large
number of states has raised the interesting problem as to whether
such laws can have any application to cases arising between mas-
ter and servant engaged in interstate transportation by rail, or
whether in such cases the Federal Employer's Liability Act must
be held to be exclusively applicable. On this precise point, there
are but two decisions by state supreme courts, and as these deci-
sions are in conflict, a brief inquiry as to which is the sound one
on principle would seem to be warranted.
In Staley v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co." an employee of the
defendant railroad was killed while engaged in interstate com-
merce. As no negligence on the part of the carrier was alleged,
it was contended that the state compensation law applied, and
that such law did not cover the same field as the federal act
which provided a remedy only in those cases of injuries which
1268 IIl. 356.
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resulted from the negligence of the carrier. The court held,
however, that the field taken possession of by the passage of the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, was the employer's liability for
injuries to employees in interstate transportation by rail, regard-
less of negligence or lack of negligence, and therefore the fed-
eral act was exclusively applicable.
In Winfield vs. N. Y. C. & Hudson River R. R. Co.,2 on facts
similar to those of the Illinois case, it was held that as the federal
act made no provision for compensation to an injured employee
engaged in interstate commerce, unless the injuries resulted from
the negligence of the carrier, it had no application to those cases
where the injuries were not the result of such negligence.
Therefore an employee injured, while engaged in interstate com-
merce, without negligence on the part of the carrier might main-
tain a claim under the state workman's compensation law, as
the latter did not cover the same field as the federal act. A simi-
lar result was reached by the New Jersey Supreme Court.3
Prior to the passage of the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
the laws of the several states were held to be determinative of
the liability of interstate carriers for injuries received by their
employees when engaged in interstate commerce. Congress,
though empowered to legislate over the subject, not having acted,
the matter was one which fell within the police power of the
states.4 After the passage of the federal act, however, the state
laws on that subject were held to be superseded, and the Federal
Employer's Liability Act was held to be exclusively applicable to
cases of injuries arising while the employee was engaged in
interstate commerce.5
On principle, it is submitted that the federal law should be
held to be exclusively applicable. The New York court's inter-
pretation would seem to be an unreasonable restriction of the
scope of the act. It was undoubtedly the intention of Congress
to regulate the whole matter of the liability of interstate carriers
to their employees for injuries received by the latter when
engaged in interstate commerce. Negligence was merely the
2-216 N. Y. 284.
394 Atl., 392 (N. J. Supreme Court, not the court of last resort);
95 Atl., 753 (N. J. Supreme Court, not the court of last resort).
' Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I.
'Seaboard A. L. R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492; Toledo, St. Louis &
Western R. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U. S. 454; St. Louis, Iron Mt. & Southern
R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702.
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criterion which, on the one hand, determined whether the
employee's primary right was invaded, and on the other, whether
the employer became subject to a duty.to respond in damages.
Having expressly enacted that the employer should incur a liabil-
ity in cases where he was negligent, it would seem to follow
that by implication Congress declared that no primary right of
the employee should be held to be invaded if there were no
negligence on the part of the carrier.
If the foregoing analysis be correct the state workman's com-
pensation laws in so far as they are attempted to be made applic-
able to cases of injuries received by employees while engaged in
interstate commerce, are necessarily in conflict with the federal
law. If that be so, it follows that in such cases there is no room
for their application. The Illinois case which held that the Fed-
eral Employer's Liability Act was exclusively applicable would
seem to be correct on principle.
F.R.
ENJOINING EMPLOYEES FROM SOLICITING THE TRADE OF
FORMER EMPLOYERS.
In a recent New York case,' the defendant as a driver in the
plaintiff's service delivered laundered coats and aprons to indi-
viduals and thus became acquainted with the plaintiff's customers.
Discharged by the plaintiff, the defendant induced a third party
to embark in a similar business and canvassed the customers of
the plaintiff for the new employer. An injunction was granted
prohibiting the defendant from soliciting those of plaintiff's cus-
tomers of whom defendant had obtained knowledge while in
the service of the plaintiff.
Where a clerk, apprentice or salesman as part of his con-
tract of employment agrees that he will not solicit in opposition
to the employer, he will be enjoined from doing that which he
agreed not to do.2 The negative covenant is considered fair and
reasonable and equitable relief by way of injunction is granted
because the remedy at law is inadequate as the damages for the
breach are uncertain. Similarly, parties will be enjoined from
disclosing the secrets pertaining to the employer's business where
there is an agreement that in consideration of employment, they
'People's Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co. v. Light, 157 N. Y. S. 15.
'Mumual Milk & Cream Co. v. Heldt, 12o A. D. 793; 22 Cyc. 867.
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will not divulge such secrets. 3 And in such case it is unneces-
sary that there should be an express covenant, if such agreement
may fairly be implied from the circumstances of the case and
the relation of the parties.4
By the common law, independent of copyright or letters pat-
ent, an inventor or author has an exclusive property in his inven-
tion or composition until by publication it becomes the property
of the general public.5 A similar property right exists in case
of trade processes and trade secrets and this will be protected
against one who in violation of contract or breach of faith under-
takes to apply the secret to his own use or to impart it to others.6
And so as regards employees, an implied agreement in fact is
not needed in all cases. For "when a confidential relationship
has existed, out of which one of the parties has derived knowl-
edge of secrets concerning the other, equity fastens an obligation
upon his conscience not to divulge such knowledge and enforces
the obligation when necessary by injunction.""
What is of primary concern here? Is it the interests of the
employer that equity seeks to preserve? Will equity protect the
employer from every and all injuries that a former employee
may cause? This is hardly the case. For the stock of exper-
ience which an employee has added to his capital is a source of
injury. For the greater the experience, the greater value will
this employee be to a rival business and thus the training
obtained from the old employer will now be utilized against his
interests. But equity will not prevent this.
For, with the exception of valuable trade secrets acquired
while in a given service, an employee may use the skill and
knowledge there gained in the service of a rival, even when
wrongfully leaving the original employment.8 So that it is not
every damage suffered by the employer through the conduct of a
former employee that equity will relieve against. It is only
when a property right is being unfairly interfered with or a
breach of trust is involved that equity comes to the aid of the
employer. When the employee attempts to use for himself or
aFralich v. Despar, 165 Pa. St. 24.
"Westervelt v. National Paper Co., 154 Ind. 673.
'Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 352.
'Morison v. Most, 9 Hare 241; Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452; Park
& Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24.
'Little v. Gallus, 4 A. D. 569; High on Injunctions, §ig.
'Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132 Iowa 155.
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others secret processes or trade secrets that were disclosed to him
in confidence, he. will be enjoined. Our problem then is to deter-
mine whether a trade secret is involved in the principal case.
What do the authorities say?
In Simms v. Burnette the court held that the knowledge
acquired by a book-keeper as to where and what his employer
buys and to whom he sells may be used, for this does not con-
stitute a secret process or trade secret. And in Stein v. National
Life Association,10 where a general insurance agent left his
employer and attempted to divert policy holders in the company
formerly employing him, no injunction was granted as the rela-
tion to the employer was not confidential in the sense that he
acquired knowledge of any business secret. And similarly in
Salomon v. Hertz," injunction was refused to prohibit defend-
ants from making known where and from whom complainant
buys his materials and to whom he sells his goods because this
is not a trade secret.
We thus see that ordinarily courts do not consider a knowledge
of the customers as either of a confidential nature or a trade
secret. Of course where one has access to the employer's books
and copies the list of customers, the knowledge is gained in a
reprehensible manner and the use of the names thus obtained will
be enjoined.12
In the principal case, the court treats the acquaintance with
the customers as being in the nature of a trade secret. It does
not purport to hold that in no case may the employee solicit for
himself or others the trade he canvassed for his former employer.
For in a New York case cited in the opinion,' 3 a former sales-
man of a wholesale butter and egg house was not enjoined from
dealing with the retail dealers for a rival concern. And the dis-
tinction attempted to be drawn is that in the cited case the cus-
tomers were listed in the city directory and their places of
business were conducted publicly while in the principal case the
parties dealt with were private individuals not easily discover-
able as possible customers by means of a directory.
55 Fla. 702.
, io5 Ga. 821.
4o N. J. E. 4oo (court holds that even an agreement to that effect may
well be regarded as limited in its obligation to the term of his service).
'Robb v. Green, 64 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 593; Stevens Co. v. Stiles, 29
R. I. 399.
' Boosing v. Dorman, 148 A. D. 824.
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There are but few authorities that protect an employer from
competition by former employees in the absence of an agree-
ment. An earlier New York case relied on by the principal
case1 4 dealt with the unfair use of a list of customers, which
acts constituted a penal offence in New York.' 5 The Empire
Steam Laundry Co. v. Lozier" seemingly supports this proposi-
tion. Though there was a contract not to solicit, the court held
that the knowledge acquired by the driver of the customers is in
the nature of a trade secret and he would be enjoined from
soliciting even in the absence of contract. This conclusion is
greatly influenced by the quoted English case of Lamb v.
Evans,'7 which on close investigation does not seem to uphold
this proposition.
Is it desirable in principle to stretch the meaning of trade
secrets so as to have it include the customers and to give the
employer a monopolistic right to them as against the employee?
Considerations of public policy and justice should decide whether
an obligation of so burdensome a character shall be imposed on
the employee. Is it not consonant with the welfare and best
interests of society that the employee be permitted to utilize this
knowledge to his advantage? For this would add to the oppor-
tunities of the employee to increase his earning capacity and to
elevate himself from his status. It is therefore questionable
whether the principal case was right in creating an obligation on
the employee not to solicit the customers of whom he received
knowledge while in the employ of plaintiff.
M. H. L.
14 Witkop & Holnes Co. v. Boyce, 112 N. Y. S. 874; 118 N. Y. S. 461(trial of same case).
'
5 N. Y. Penal Code, Sect. 642.
1' i65 Cal. 95.
'
TL. R. 1893, I Ch. Div. 218, which affirmed L. R. 1892, 3 Ch. Div. 462(canvassers of directory enjoined from using blocks and materials for
rival but court expressly allows them to canvass the same trades for a
rival directory [see pp. 469, 47o]).
